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Article 9

CHAPTER III.
THE TAIWAN ISSUE
Richard L. Walker*
It is difficult to bring to the problem of China and Taiwan that
detachment and balance usually associated with concepts of justice and a rule
of law. In part, this is true because of Americans' romantic and emotional
attachment to that great civilization. Since the White House has once again
joined both Peking and Taipei in saying that there is but one China, and
Taiwan is part of China, I believe we can expect some of the romanticism of
China to wash off in our dealing with Taiwan.
With regard to the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), its intensified
relations with the Western world, and it policies and attitudes toward the
Republic of China on Taiwan (R.O.C.), it is desirable to point out the fact that
we Americans tend, and have tended for the last three decades, to attribute
far more stability and continuity in projecting present policies into the future
than has been warranted by the facts. There have been wide and frequent
swings in Peking's attitudes, usually linked to internal power considerations.
Thus on June 5, 1979, international news services reported from Peking that,
once again, only officially authorized Chinese citizens would be allowed to
speak to foreigners. This occurred after many reporters and scholars had been
led to believe that the more liberal policies inaugurated earlier in the year
would be the course for the remainder of the century and had written in
glowing terms of China's move toward a more open society.
Again, it is worth pointing out that we have tended to postulate a unity
for China and for its current leadership, a unity which is not only absent but
which has now been shown to be false. If we know this was not so under Mao
(and recent revelations are showing us how really deep were the fissures
during his Stalin-like rule), how much more risky will be the projection of
unity as a basis for evolving policies toward China in the years ahead, when a
major generational transition is occurring? This will be particularly true as
regards our policy towards Taiwan and our expectations of P.R.C. attitudes
on the Taiwan issue.
With regard to both Taiwan and the P.R.C., there has been a general
tendency in the United States to accept official plans and claims as reality.
This stems, in part, from our romanticism about China and its people, but it
is also a result of a general lack of verifiable information about social and
political policies and developments. Time after time, we are proven wrong
about China and we are misled by the projections of our own wishes and
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institutions onto the Chinese scene. When Chou En-lai made off-hand
remarks about Chinese population, we could expect that American media
would quote this as fact. Two scholarly and political camps in the United
States tended to form emotional attachments to their own versions of a
democratic and progressive China: one represented by the P.R.C., the other
by Taiwan. All too often critical judgment was suspended even in the
terminology used. Taiwan was called our "loyal democratic ally"; such
terminology discouraged our reminding ourselves that those in charge in
Taipei would look after their own interests, and that there was little
likelihood that their loyalties were to America, rather than to their own
cause.
The "Carter Shock" of December 15, 1978 tended to obscure in the
emotional language which followed some of the realities of the continuing
Taiwan issue, its relationship to the whole evolving Pacific Basin, and the
manner in which it is linked to American credibility in a whole range of
functional areas involving our national future. The manner in which Carter
handled this emotional issue only tended to exacerbate the problem in many
respects and has led to recriminations and antagonisms between the
executive and legislative branches, between the Department of State and the
American business community, and within the ranks of the "Chinawatchers." The rudeness associated with its style raised questions as to
whether the men in Washington had profited at all from past mistakes and
failures to understand the importance of manners and ceremony in dealing
with areas across the Pacific where style becomes substance.
In approaching our continuing Taiwan problem, it is perhaps worthwhile
to mention just a few background facts, particularly since we are frequently
misled into judging Taiwan's significance by contrasting its size and
population with the overwhelming character of all of mainland China: for
instance, seventeen and one-half million people as opposed to one billion;
nineteen thousand square miles as opposed to more than three and one-half
million square miles.
Taiwan represents today one of the most balanced and successful
examples of economic and social development in the world. As a world
economic actor, it surpasses all of mainland China and it is among the top ten
trading partners of the United States. As a political entity it ranks among the
top quarter of the countries in the world in population and economic activity.
Growth in the past decade has been nothing short of phenomenal. Per capita
income, which in 1969 stood at $287, has increased to over $1500 this year where Japan was in 1969. Taiwan's world trade was $1.7 billion in 1968; last
year it totalled $23.7 - where Japan stood in 1967. Much more impressive
has been the general extension of the benefits of modernization and social
improvement to the whole population. Linked with this is the fact that it has
been done while the government has placed emphasis on the maintenance of
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traditional Chinese culture and family life. Thus, the R.O.C. has been a much
more serious contender as an alternative way of adjusting Chinese culture to
the age of the computer, the transistor and atomic power than its relatively
smaller population and size would indicate.
I would like to make five major points on the future of Taiwan and the
P.R.C. and our relations with both of these political entities as we point
toward the last two decades of this century. First, despite opinions from the
White House that the integrity of Taiwan had been preserved, the security of
the R.O.C., and especially its economic security, remains a very grave
problem. Taiwan's very success makes it more vulnerable. In many respects,
it is like Japan because it is so dependent on trade, free access to market and
secure sea lanes. In Japan's case, however, there is no rival government
hoping to strangle its success.
In its initial attempt to come to grips with the Chinese problem, the
White House version of the Taiwan Relations Act 1 attempted to pretend that
there really is no government on Taiwan and that the United States would
deal with the people there only as individual citizens. The naivet6 of this
proposed piece of legislation was quickly exposed in the Congressional
hearings, and the Americans were reminded that there is indeed still a
government on Taiwan which exercises control and sovereignty over its
territories, and that we are going to have to deal with it. This becomes for us
an especially sensitive area of operation because of the contrast in the
successes in Taiwan as compared with. the failures in so many areas in the
three decades of Communist rule of the P.R.C., failures now being revealed by
the men in charge in Peking. There are many reasons, therefore, for us to
remember that the Taiwan problem has not been solved. Competing Chinese
regimes have not been eliminated from the Western Pacific. The militarysecurity aspects of this competition will continue to worry us even after the
security treaty expires.
Second, the Taiwan issue cannot be divorced from the whole regional
structure of economic and military security in the Western Pacific. Though
there are China advisers in the White House who wish that somehow Taiwan
would disappear, this is unlikely to happen. Taiwan has been an intimate
part of the development of the whole Western Pacific area which has
accelerated over the past decade. It is linked into Telstar, Telex and computer
nets; it is part of an interdependent trade pattern; it is bound up in the
growth of modern tourism.
Because all of this development in the 1960s and 1970s is closely related
to U.S. power, posture and credibility, the Taiwan problem cannot be
1. Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). See Appendix-Selected Documents p. 114
infra.
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separated from other regional considerations. The Defense Treaty,' whose
abrogation has raised sensitive internal political problems for Washington,
was not an isolated one. Other defense commitments were bound to be called
into question. Thus, the future and security of Taiwan have come to be linked
intimately in the Western Pacific with, for instance, the security of Japan's
sea lanes, Korean development and military security, and Philippine
self-confidence. In addition, too many U.S. presidential and congressional
guarantees were made to Taiwan to be dismissed with impunity. The sudden
announcement on December 15, 1978 could not eliminate without serious
repercussions this aspect of the reality of Taiwan. That was one of the
messages which eventually Congress had to carry to an Executive branch
which was caught up in America's China romance.
Third, this means that contrary to what has sometimes been so easily
asserted by American supporters of President Carter's precipitate action on
China policy, Taiwan is not comparable either in reality or as an issue to
Hong Kong. While one of the new and very successful export-processing zones
in the southern port city of Kaohsiung might be comparable to Hong Kong,
there is no comparison in terms of the security and political question. On
Taiwan, Asia's first republic retains traditions whose roots and history are
hardly insignificant. The government on Taiwan still has the trappings of a
sovereign state - a bureaucracy, a national educational system and the
symbols of legitimate authority: army, courts, police and capacity to enforce
laws. As pointed out, the R.O.C. constitutes a challenge to Peking and many
of the claims advanced by the P.R.C.
Fourth, despite actions which seemed to take away American links to the
R.O.C., Taiwan remains an American responsibility. It is linked with our
businesses and other broad ranging activities. The American Chamber of
Commerce in Taipei represents, for instance, more than 600 American firms
in Taiwan. Much of the industrial growth in the island republic has been
geared to American standards and spare parts; tens of thousands of its
citizens have graduated from American colleges and universities; its legal
and business practices are more and more synchronized with those of the
United States. Thus, when it came time for the White House to pretend that
we would have no dealings whatsoever with the governmental authorities a move which the Carter Administration agreed upon without getting any
sort of a quid pro quo - this was quickly revealed to be a position that was
impossible to maintain. One of the American Chamber representatives, who
came to Washington to testify in February, 1979, wondered what would
happen with the many cases which would have to be adjudicated before the

2. [1955] 6 U.S.T. 433, T.I.A.S. No. 3178.
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courts in Taiwan if we decided there was no government there whose
authority could be acknowledged.
Perhaps a most important part of the continuing responsibility which the
United States has for the future of Taiwan lies in these very commercial
dealings and the personal contacts. They are, after all, the real stuff of
international relations and the sustenance of international faith and
credibility. That faith has also involved the tooling of the whole R.O.C.
defense establishment to U.S. weapons systems. It is of little value to say that
the people in Taiwan can take care of their own security without U.S.
military contracts and supplies. This is why the secret deal between
President Carter's negotiators and the P.R.C., revealed in the Washington
Post on January 12, 1979 after the White House had assured the American
public there had been no secret deals, proved so alarming to Congress. If the
Administration was going to close off new weapons acquisitions while the
security treaty was technically still in effect, how could the United States
convince others that we would honor a commitment to supply defensive arms
to the R.O.C. after the treaty, renounced unilaterally, had expired? The
attempt to eliminate U.S. responsibility for the future of Taiwan cannot
wash. The United States retains a responsibility for the future of Taiwan, and
this fact has now been legislated into the Taiwan Relations Act which the
President has signed. It will require a constant and intense vigilance to
ensure that the intent of this act is not violated by the China romantics who
would once again be tempted to give something away for nothing.
Fifth, in the final analysis, the Chinese in Taiwan and in the P.R.C. are
better prepared to handle the current duality and fiction of the American
Institute in Taiwan and the Coordination Council for North American Affairs
than we are. The Chinese are used to clothing stark realities in the garb of
different surface appearances. This is true of both Taiwan and the P.R.C. In
Taiwan, for example, the fiction of a national government has been
maintained to cloak the reality of the management of the state by a small but
capable group of revolutionary modernizers from the Chinese mainland. In
the P.R.C. all sorts of charades were played in the name of Mao Tse-tung and
the most serious power struggles remained hidden under the smooth surface
of unanimity. Or again, let us remember back through history that the
duality of the period of Manchu rule in China (1644-1911) remained obscure
to most Westerners. Chinese understand the necessity of fictions for
maintaining face.
The real problem in Taiwan is to make sure that the reality of the U.S.
undergirding of the island's security remains unimpaired, that the U.S.
presence in the area remains credible. What the negotiators for the
"normalization" with the P.R.C. seemed to have forgotten temporarily is that
on that score Peking is just as anxious for a credible U.S. presence in the
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Western Pacific as is Taiwan. This is likely to continue to be the case as long
as Soviet power grows unabated and the "polar bear," as the Chinese
Communist leaders like to call the Soviets, swims unrestrained in the waters
off China.
Such considerations would tend to point toward a couple of very clear
conclusions for the future of U.S. policies on the Taiwan question. First, there
is not likely to be any quick or easy solution, and the current situation
cannot be expected to change rapidly. Second, there is no need for American
impatience. What appears to be a still murky and unresolved issue may, in
reality, be an issue which is not at all unsatisfactory and one on which any
precipitate action would only make matters worse. Finally, it should be clear
that the Taiwan-China relationship is more and more a part of the whole
Pacific Basin security problem, and that is one from which the United States
cannot and should not try to disengage.

COMMENTS
Yuan-li Wu*
At this conference a variety of issues has been discussed: was normalization appropriate; was it instituted at the right gains or losses to the United
States? But my concern is the Taiwan issue which remains unresolved and
which will not be resolved in one fell swoop. I propose, therefore, to share
with you some of my own thoughts. My purpose is neither to re-examine the
past nor to apportion either blame or praise, but to look to the future.
First, whatever one may think of normalization, it has had the effect of
changing the international environment in Northeast Asia and the Western
Pacific with a special focus upon Taiwan. It has affected the perceptions of the
decision-makers of the major powers; their responses have in turn affected
the subsequent decisions and perceptions of other powers.
What are the advantages and disadvantages to the major powers of
maintaining Taiwan as an independent entity? What if Taiwan were no
longer an independent entity but subject to the influence of an adversary or
potential adversary of any of the major powers?
To the People's Republic of China (P.R.C.), Taiwan is in a unique position
to provide a strategic lever against Japan by virtue of its location on Japan's
* Consultant to the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace at Stanford University; Professor of Economics, University of San Francisco; Specialist in international economic and political affairs.
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sea routes, through both the Taiwan Strait and the Bashi Channel. Taiwan is
also important to the P.R.C. because it is on the only side of the Chinese
mainland that is not blocked by the Soviet Union or by powers technically
allied with it. To the Soviet Union, the control of Taiwan must be denied the
P.R.C. since Taiwan is the only place that offers Peking potential leverage
against Japan. Taiwan is the only remaining country besides Japan that
would complete the Soviet encirclement of the P.R.C.
As long as they are hostile towards each other, neither the People's
Republic of China nor the Soviet Union would wish to see Taiwan in the
opponent's hands as exemplified by the reasons stated above. Consequently,
stability in the Western Pacific would be disrupted if either Peking or the
Soviet Union believed that Taiwan could fall into the hands of the other. That
would be a situation fraught with danger.
The second point that I wish to stress is that Taiwan is also important for
the United States because it is situated on the sea routes of Japan. Therefore,
Taiwan should be denied to any country that is potentially hostile and
interested in disrupting the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Furthermore, if the
P.R.C. should turn out to be more aggressive and expansive than we would
like to see, we might need an alternative - Taiwan. Finally, in the event of a
Sino-Soviet rapprochement and to the extent that the Eurasian continent is
under Soviet influence, we would wish to have an island defense line along
the eastern coast of Asia as a bulwark west of Hawaii.
For the above reasons, it is essential that we build up Taiwan's
confidence in its own security and convince Peking that it is in its own best
interest not to disturb Taiwan's sense of confidence. Otherwise, Peking might
compel Taiwan to undertake a radical policy change that might prove
regrettable. In that connection, if you examine carefully the Taiwan Relations
Act,' you would probably find that the American Institute is not particularly
appropriate as a vehicle to preserve military liaison in matters requiring a
timely response. Closer coordination and contact between the military on
both sides is needed. I wish to stress that reinforcing Taiwan's confidence and
security will not damage our relations with the P.R.C. Rather, only when the
former feels sufficiently secure and the latter is convinced that it will be
futile to use force to reincorporate Taiwan, military or otherwise, can there be
a fruitful dialogue between the two countries. Such a dialogue will benefit the
continuation of profitable coexistence between Taiwan and the People's
Republic of China.
Finally, we have heard a great deal about the possibility of trade
between the P.R.C. and the United States, with estimates ranging from
1. Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979). See Appendix-Selected Documents p. 114
infra.
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$1.6-2 billion worth this year to $4-5 billion by 1985. All this speculation is
predicated upon the assumption that modernization programs will succeed.
Basically, there are only two routes by which the Chinese might succeed in
their modernization program. One is the Saudi Arabian route, i.e., mineral
and oil exports, the only problem being that there is a substantial time lag
(seven to eight years) due to the construction of the new production facilities.
The South Korea or Taiwan route is the second route to P.R.C. modernization, featuring the exportation of textiles, garments, electronic material and
equipment through business firms. Those involved include the Chinese,
Japanese, people from Hong Kong and other foreigners who will participate
in joint ventures and other arrangements. This method is opening the bottle
and letting the genie out. One may not be able to put the genie back. In the
end, the Chinese may no longer have a system that they could truly call
communist. That would be fine with us, but probably not with Mr. Teng and
his colleagues. They probably are as truly communist as they claim to be.
Then there are two modes of failure. One is the Albania-Burma model.
That is, nothing much happens for decades except some increase in the
population, sufficient to offset any increase in output. The other is what I call
the Iranian model, highlighted by a period of expansion which is followed by
collapse. In either case, one would find east of the Soviet Union a large land
mass and population that is impotent in the world arena, creating problems
for everybody and of doubtful use as a counterweight to the Soviet Union.
Let me conclude with a story. One famous Peking opera is entitled "The
Undefended City." Scene one opens with Chu-ke Liang, the Henry Kissinger
of his time in the period of the Three Kingdoms, sitting on top of the city
wall. A scout comes to him to report that the enemy's troops were about
twenty miles away. Chu-ke had no troops at home and for the first time, Tsao
Tsao and his troops caught the famous strategist unprepared. What was he to
do? He ordered that the city gates be opened, that a banquet be set on top of
the city wall and that a few old, dilapidated street sweepers work on the
street, with no troops in sight.
Scene two is set in the enemy's camp. The scout of Tsao Tsao's troops
came back and reported that as far as he could see the city was undefended,
and that Chu-ke Liang was just enjoying himself and having a banquet laid
out. So the Security Council was called and a meeting took place in Tsao
Tsao's camp. The members of the meeting came to the unanimous conclusion
that the moment to attack had come because the enemy was caught
unprepared. But Tsao Tsao said, "No, we retreat because never would Chu-ke
be caught unprepared - he is far too sagacious, too wise, too farseeing, too
good a planner."
I would submit that Chou En-lai and his successor, Mr. Teng, might be
playing the same game.

